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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT
-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
On June 30, 1970, Ohio became the 38th state to ratify the twenty-
sixth amendment to the United States Constituion. The twenty-sixth
amendment has precipitated much litigation focusing on the problem
of the voting residence of the newly enfranchised eighteen year old
voters. It provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.'
The problem is whether the newly enfranchised young people, re-
siding apart from their parents, should be treated like other voters for
purposes of acquiring a voting residence, or should they be presumed
to reside with their parents.
The Supreme Court of California exercised its original jurisdiction
to hear the petition of nine unmarried minor residents of California
who sought to register to vote in a jurisdiction that they claimed to be
their actual permanent residence. Pursuant to a published opinion of
the Attorney General of California 2 which established a presumption
that unmarried minors reside with their parents, the petitioners were
not permitted to register to vote. In reliance on this opinion, the regis-
trars had determined that the petitioners lacked the capacity to estab-
lish their own voting residence. The registrars totally disregarded such
factors as the self-support of several of the petitioners and the lack
of physical presence of one of the applicants at his parents' domicile.
The Supreme Court of California, on August 27, 1971, decided that:
minors of 18 years of age or older be treated as emancipated and hence as adults
for voting purposes in light of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.3
I. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI.
2. 54 Adv. Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 7, 12 (1971), states in pertinent part that
"for voting purposes the residence of an unmarried minor (whether student or
not) . . . will normally be his parents' home" regardless of where the minor's
present or intended future habitation might be.
3. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698, 488 P.2d 1, 2 (1971).
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On the same day that the California Supreme Court rendered its
decision, the Supreme Court of Michigan made a similar pronounce-
ment. The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to eight
petitioning students of the University of Michigan. These petitioners
were denied registration for voting even though each of them stipulated
that: They were citizens of the United States residing in Michigan for
more than six months; that each met the minimum voting age of
eighteen years; that each of them maintained an apartment as his
regular place of abode in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and habitually slept
there; and that each of them commonly kept his personal effects in
his apartment. The denial of registration was founded on M.C.L.A.
Sec. 168.11(b) which provides that: "no elector shall be deemed to
have gained or lost a residence . . .while a student at any institution
of learning. . .. -4 Upon review of these facts, the Supreme Court
of Michigan held the above section of the Michigan statutes to be
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution, 5 and thus unconstitutional under the
United States and Michigan Constitutions.6 The Michigan Supreme
Court stated that "students must be treated the same as all other
registrants."' 7 Wilkins v. Bentley, 189 N.W. 2d 423 (1971).
Jointly, these two cases exemplify the problems confronting eighteen
year old voters who have severed parental ties or who live on college
campuses. The volume of litigation arising from these problems is
increasing as election times draw near, especially since college com-
munities are afraid the students will constitute a controlling voting
block if allowed to vote at their college residences.
The purpose of this casenote is to examine the suffrage right of stu-
dent voters when scrutinized under the twenty-sixth amendment and
the equal protection clause," especially in relation to the validity of
state laws which presume that students do not establish a voting resi-
dence by their mere presence on the college campus.
The authority of the states to legislate on the subject of voting is
implied in the Federal Constitution.9 The power of state legislatures
4. 5 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1011(b) (Supp. 1971).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . .deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
7. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 694, 189 N.W.2d 423, 434 (1971).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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to enact registration laws are recognized as early as 1886 when the
constitutionality of an Illinois election law was challenged in People v.
Hoffman.10  The Illinois court stated: "The weight of authority in
this country is in favor of the power of the (state) legislature to
enact registry laws."" This prerogative conferred upon the states is
curtailed by the Federal Constitution 12 and by acts of Congress.' 3
The right of United States citizens to vote in state or federal elec-
tions
is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States .... the privilege
to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as
the State may direct. .... 14
The laws of the state where the citizen has his voting residence, de-
termines whether he can register and exercise his right to vote.' 5
The term "voting residence" means more than mere residence, which
requires only physical' 6 presence. Instead, "voting residence" has gen-
erally been interpreted to be synonomous with domicile.'17 The Supreme
Court of Colorado in Sharp v. Mclntire18 stated that domicile: "re-
quires, not only a personal presence . . . but a concurrence therewith
of an intention to make the place of inhabitancy the true home. .... 19
(Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, all of the consequences of a domi-
cile carry over to "voting residence" to-wit: A person must have a
domicile or residence somewhere; 20 a domicile or residence either of
origin or of choice once attained, must be abandoned before a new
one can be acquired by the requisite physical presence' and intention to
remain in the new place;2 1 a "domicile or voting place remains and
continues until he has acquired a legal residence or domicile else-
where;"' 22 and a person cannot have two or more domiciles or voting
10. 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 (1886).
11. Id. at 609, 5 N.E. at 606.
12. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
13. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
14. Pope v. Williams, supra note 12, at 632.
15. In re Bocchiaro, 49 F. Supp. 37 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
16. Application of Wooley, 108 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1951).
17. Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 5 So. 2d 788 (1942); Sharp v. McIntire,
23 Colo. 99, 46 P. 115 (1896).
18. Sharp v. McIntire, supra note 17.
19. Sharp v. McIntire, supra note 17, at 102, 46 P. at 116.
20. Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 Ill. 591, 26 N.E. 704 (1891).
21. People v. Turpin, 49 Colo. 234, 112 P. 539 (1910).
22. Kay v. Strobeck, 81 Colo. 144, 149, 254 P. 150, 152 (1927).
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residences at the same time.2 8 The right to vote is recognized to exist
only in the state where a citizen has his voting residence or domicile. 24
The acquisition of a domicile or voting residence thus requires con-
currence of physical presence and the intent to remain in that place,
indefinitely. 25  Physical presence does not create a problem since all
that is necessary to fulfill this requirement is actual physical presence at
the new domicile, "however brief" 26 that may be. The requisite intent
to establish a domicile is, however, more complex and problematical, since
it must be a present intention 27 to remain there, indefinitely.28  A tempo-
rary presence is not sufficient to establish a new domicile2" nor to abandon
the old domicile.30 Furthermore, most jurisdictions presume that certain
persons are incapable of choosing or changing their domicile and these
persons are given a domicile by operation of law. Domiciles arising by
operation of law are created by presumptions such as: The domicile of a
wife and children follows the domicile of the husband; 3 ' a minor child
upon reaching the age of discretion can sever parental ties and become
emancipated and thus capable of choosing his own domicile;32 and the
domicile of a married man is considered to be where his family resides
unless such residence is for a temporary purpose. 3 3 Difficulties also arise
when an individual must prove his intent to change or create a domicile.
His acts rather than his declarations are considered by the courts to be
23. Supra note 20.
24. Parsons v. People, 30 Colo. 388, 70 P. 689 (1902).
25. Supra note 17.
26. White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
27. Thompson v. Emmert, 242 Ky. 415, 46 S.W.2d 502 (1932). The court
stated: "A mere floating intention to establish a residence at some future time
. ..is not sufficient." Id. at 417, 46 S.W.2d at 503.
28. United States v. Luria, 184 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). The court
stated: "If the person's intention is limited to a period itself determined by some
definite event, even though the occurrence of that event may be uncertain, he
has not the requisite intention." Id. at 650. Cf. Jansen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1962).
29. Matney v. Elswick, 242 Ky. 183, 45 S.W.2d 1046 (1932).
30. Wilkerson v. Lee, 236 Ala. 104, 181 So. 296 (1938), where the Supreme
Court of Alabama held: "Temporary absence from one's residence for the pur-
poses of his employment and the like, without the intent to abandon the home
town and acquire a domicile elsewhere permanently, or for an indefinite time,
does not forfeit his right to vote." Id. at 107, 181 So. at 298. Accord, Mitchell v.
Kinney, supra note 17, 242 Ala. at 208, 5 So. 2d at 798.
31. Hill v. Niblett, 171 Md. 653, 187 A. 869 (1936).
32. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 782 (1946); Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
33. Supra note 29.
the most trustworthy. evidence of the voter's residence.8 4 Once, however,
a person capable of choosing a domicile has physically located himself
at a place of inhabitance with the intent to remain there indefinitely, that
individual has a legal domicile and voting residence and he may vote
there. 3
5
A student at an institution of learning, however, has historically been
presumed not to have acquired a new domicile and voting residence
merely by reason of his presence at such institution, even though he has
the capacity to change his domicile and is physically present with the in-
tent to remain there indefinitely. In 1895, the Supreme Court of New
York, in In re Goodman,36 found that a student in a theological seminary
did not change his domicile to the district wherein the seminary was lo-
cated and thus was not allowed to vote there. In that case, the student
had no legal residence elsewhere; his family was dead and he had no
intention of changing his residence from the seminary. The court stated:
We do not mean to say that a voter may not change his legal residence into a new
district in spite of the fact that he becomes a student in an institution of learning
therein, but the facts to establish such a change must be wholly independent and
outside of his presence in the new district as a student, and should be very clear and
convincing to overcome the natural presumption.3 7
This presumption is based on the theory that students are residents at the
institution for a definite period, and thus are temporarily absent from their
true domicile. 8 In In re Garvey,39 the New York Supreme Court allowed
a student similarly situated (to the student in the Goodman case) to estab-
lish a voting residence in the district in which his seminary was located.
However, the student was placed under a severe burden to satisfy the
court of his change of domicile. To accomplish this change, he first
had to notify the registrar of the County of his former domicile of this
move, requesting that his name be removed from the voting list. Then,
he sent a letter to the registrar of the County of his new residence
explaining that his name was no longer on the voting roster at his
former residence and requesting that he be placed on the list at the
new residence. Finally, he had to show immediately after the election
a clear intent to remain at the new residence, indefinitely. These
added requirements to establish his residence were necessary solely be-
cause he was a student at an institution of learning.
34. In re Erickson, 18 N.J. Misc. 5, 10 A.2d 142 (1939).
35. Supra note 24.
36. 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895).
37. id. at 287, 40 N.E. at 770.
38. Supra note 36.
39. 147 N.Y. 117, 41 N.E. 439 (1895).
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In Welsh v. Shumway,40 the Illinois Supreme Court continued the
presumption as established in Goodman,41 that a
student in a college town is presumed not to have the right to vote. If he attempts to
vote, the burden is upon him to prove his residence at that place, and it must be done
by other evidence than his mere presence in the town. 42
The Illinois Supreme Court held, however, that a student could vote
at his college residence if he: (1) Supported himself entirely by his
own efforts; (2) was not subject to parental control; (3) regarded the
place where the college is situated as his home, even though he may
at some future time intend to move; (4) has the intention of making
it his present place of abode; and (5) has no positive and fixed in-
tention as to where he will locate when he leaves. The court went on
to say that:
The residence in such college town must be an actual, bona fide one, with no
intention of returning to the parental home upon the completion of the studies.43
Most of the cases dealing with the ability of students to establish
voting residences at their college homes evolve from state statutes or
state constitutional provisions. An example is article 8, see. 6 of the
Missouri Constitution. 44 This article provides that for purposes of vot-
ing, no person shall be deemed to have gained a residence by reason of
his presence, or to have lost it by reason of his absence, while a stu-
dent of any institution of learning. Approximately one-half of the
states have such provisions either in their constitutions or as statutes. 45
These laws require that the student must vote at his former domicile
unless he can establish a change of voting residence by facts separate
and independent of his presence at the institution. "The mere inten-
tion to change his residence would not suffice."'46 A similar law existed
in the note cases, Jolicoeur v. Mihaly47 and Wilkins v. Bentley.48
The consequence of such statutes, in light of the twenty-sixth amend-
ment, is to force the eighteen year old student, who resides at an insti-
tution of learning, to return to the county of his former domicile (or his
40. 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1907).
41. Supra note 36.
42. Supra note 40 at 88, 83 N.E. at 562.
43. Supra note 40 at 88, 83 N.E. at 563.
44. Mo. CONST. art. 8, § 6.
45. Singer, Student Power At The Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 721 (1970).
Such provisions exist in 24 states and most are identical in their wording.
46. In re Barry, 164 N.Y. 18, 21, 58 N.E. 12, 13 (1900).
47. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 488 P.2d 1 (1971).
48. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
[Vol. XXI
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parents' domicile if he is not emancipated) to vote or he must vote
by absentee ballot if such rights exists in the state of his prior domi-
cile. 49  Otherwise the student will not be entitled to vote. Thus the
newly enfranchised eighteen to twenty-one year old voters who live
away at college must overcome these obstacles to exercise their right
to vote. Furthermore, these students are forced to vote in a jurisdic-
tion from which they have not only been absent, but most likely are
unfamiliar and unconcerned with the current affairs of that voting dis-
trict.
A student living at a college residence in a state having such a statute
has no voice in the governing policies of the community in which he is
actually present. This is true even though such students are counted
as residents of that state for census purposes. The students are denied
the right to vote at the place of their abode even though they may pay
a variety of taxes. 50 This is clearly "taxation without representation."
Students are also subject to the state and local laws and are af-
fected by the decisions of the city counsel and various other city and
county legislative delegations. Students with children can and do en-
roll them in the local public school systems and still they have no
voting right in spite of a legitimate interest in the educational standards
of the community. Finally, as the court stated in Wilkins v. Bentley:
The Federal government grants deductions on the Federal tax for state and local
taxes in lieu of itemized deductions. These deductions vary from state to state.
Hence, if a student whose parents are from New York, goes to the University of
Michigan and lives in Ann Arbor, he would take a deduction based on Michigan and
not New York taxes. Thus, he is implicitly recognized as a Michigan resident for
Federal tax purposes. The Federal government further provides community health
service grants to the states based on population (which includes students).51
These statutes also ignore several other problems confronting student
voters. For example, a student who is uncertain as to his future plans
(i.e. will he remain in that community, or return to the parental domi-
49. Bullington v. Grabow, 88 Colo. 561, 298 P. 1059 (1931). Also, several
states make no provision for absentee ballots, see, SMrrH, VOTING AND ELECTION
LAWs 89-99 (1960).
50. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). The Supreme Court has
recognized that property taxes are ultimately paid by renters, such as students.
The Court stated: "Property taxes may be paid initially by property owners, but a
significant part of the ultimate burden of each year's tax on rental property will
very likely be borne by the tenant rather than the landlord since, as the parties
also stipulated in this case, the landlord will treat the property tax as a business
expense and normally will be able to pass all or a large part of this cost on to the
tenants in the form of higher rent." Id. at 210.
51. Supra note 48, at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432.
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cile, or will he move to a new community) must return to vote at his
hometown even though the community affairs there are of little con-
cern to him. Surely, this is an effective disfranchisement of student
voters, since they cannot vote where their parents are domiciled. These
statutes would also disfranchise a student whose parents have changed
their domicile to a foreign country. Thus, even though the twenty-
sixth amendment gives the privilege of suffrage to eighteen to twenty-
one year old citizens, such voters who are students living at a univer-
sity and apart from their former domiciles are not only burdened by
the state laws discussed above, but some of these voters are effectively
disfranchised.
Assuming arguendo, that these state statutes are valid it seems logical-
ly absurd that Congress and the ratifying states would consider the
right to vote important enough to enfranchise a group of citizens and
then allow various states to effectively disfranchise a section of these
new voters. These statutes appear to be repugnant to the legislative
purpose behind the twenty-sixth amendment. The Senate Committee 52
discussed the legislative purpose underlying the proposed amendment
stating:
Although some of the student unrest of recent years has led to deplorable violence
and intolerance, much of this unrest reflects the interest and concern of today's youth
over the important issues of our day. . . . The Committee believes that we must
channel these energies into our political system and give young people the real oppor-
tunity to influence our society in a peaceful and constructive manner. . . . More-
over, forcing younger voters to undertake special burdens-obtaining absentee bal-
lots, or traveling to one centralized location in each city, for example--in order to
exercise their right to vote might well serve to dissuade them from participating in
the election. This result, and the election procedures that create it, are at least in-
consistent with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act, which sought to encourage
greater political participation on the part of the young. . . .53 (Emphasis supplied).
This inconsistency between the legislative purpose and intent underlying
the twenty-sixth amendment and state restrictions limiting the exercise
of the right to vote seemingly render the state laws invalid. As the
Supreme Court of California stated in Freedland v. Greco,54 "Statutes
should . . . promote rather than defeat the legislative purpose and
policy."
55
Furthermore, these state laws defeat one of the objectives often as-
serted as a basis for prescribing residency qualifications of voters, specif-
52. Supra note 47, at 701, 488 P.2d at 5.
53. 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 365-375.
54. 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955).
55. Id. at 467, 289 P.2d at 466.
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ically "community interest."'56  In Shenton v. Abbott,57 the Maryland
Appellate Court stated:
The object of the framers of the Constitution (of Maryland) in prescribing residence
as a qualification for the exercise of the elective franchise was not only to identify
the voters and to prevent fraud but also to assure that each voter would become in
fact a member of his community and take an interest in its government.5 8
How can a student residing at an institution of learning become an
interested member of another community in which he does not reside?
It is only logical, that a student would be more concerned about the
college community in which he resides since the governing policies of
that community directly affect him.
Finally, state laws specifically restricting student voters from exer-
cising their vote are discriminatory because students are not the most
transient group in our society. The United States Census Bureau in
the 1960 census indicated that the largest group of transients were
"operative and kindred workers" with "craftsmen and foremen" second,
and "professional and technical personnel" third.59
Even assuming that students are 'professionals' they are not the most mobile group in
society, either in terms of profession, or education. There is, in short, no rational
basis on which the state can base its presumption that students will move from the
university town once their schooling is complete, and deny them the right to vote,
while allowing young 'operatives' without a high school education, the most mobile
part of our society, to register and vote.60
From the prior discussion, the invalidity of those state laws, which
create the presumption that student voters do not have their voting
residence at their college homes, becomes apparent. Those laws are
unfair and are founded on the groundless presumption that student
transiency is the highest among all groups of interstate and intrastate
movers. Furthermore, the laws place such a heavy burden on a stu-
dent who wishes to exercise his right to vote that they effectively deny
or abridge the right to vote and, therefore, are unconstitutional since
they directly conflict with the twenty-sixth amendment and its legisla-
tive purpose.
Another line of analysis exists which also exposes the unconstitution-
ality of state laws that restrict the suffrage right of students who live at
college, apart from their parents. An examination of the development
56. Supra note 31.
57. 178 Md. 526, 15 A.2d 906 (1940).
58. Id. at 531, 15 A.2d at 908.
59. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a
Mobile Society, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 823, 830 n.10 (1963).
60. Singer, supra note 45, at 712.
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of the right to vote under the equal protection clause"' crystallizes the
constitutional infirmity of such restraints.
This argument begins with the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,62 where-
in the Supreme Court stated that the right to vote "is regarded as a
fundamental political right, because it is preservative of all rights."63
Since that case, the right to vote has been described as: The most
basic civil right in a democracy; 4 "the very essence of our democratic
process-that is to be liberally and not strictly construed to promote
and not to defeat or impede the essential design of the organic law;"6 5
the most precious right in a free country; 66 so fundamental that "any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized; 61 7 and being "close to the core of our con-
stitutional system and a fundamental right of every citizen."68
An examination of the history and development of the interpretation
and scope of the application of the equal protection clause discloses
the significance of the judicial recognition of the right to vote as a
fundamental right. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"9 the Supreme Court held
that local officials had arbitrarily applied several San Francisco ordi-
nances, so unequally and oppressively, as to amount to a practical de-
nial by the State of the equal protection of the laws which is secured
to the petitioners through the fourteenth amendment. 70  The Court thus
intimated that a law valid on its face, is unconstitutional, if, by granting
unlimited discretionary powers to the enforcing authorities, the law re-
sults in arbitrary and discriminatory application.7'
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
63. Id. at 370.
64. Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948). The Supreme
Court of Arizona held: "In a democracy suffrage is the most basic civil right, since
its exercise is the chief means whereby other rights may be safeguarded. To deny
the right to vote, where one is legally entitled to do so, is to do violence to the
principles of freedom and equality." ld. at 342, 196 P.2d at 459.
65. Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 12, 134 A.2d 1, 7 (1957).
66. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
67. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
68. Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69, 73 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
69. Supra note 62.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. Supra note 62, at 373, 374. The Court stated: 'Though the law itself be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
[Vol. XXI
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As the application of the fourteenth amendment has developed since
Yick Wo, at least two standards have emerged for testing the constitu-
tional validity of a state statute on equal protection grounds. The first
and original standard of review, looks to the reasonableness of the
classification in light of its legislative purpose. 72 The Supreme Court
articulately described this formula in McGowan v. Maryland73 when it
held that: "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.''74
The second standard imposes a more active judicial policy, and under
it, a discriminatory classification can be upheld only when the state has
shown it necessary in the service of some "compelling state interest.1 75
This standard is applicable only when a fundamental and constitutionally
protected right is involved.76 In the absence of a controversy involving
such right, the Court has refused to apply the more stringent "compel-
ling state interest" test. 77 Thus whenever the Supreme Court has char-
acterized a right as being fundamental, any state law limiting that
right is carefully scrutinized under the "compelling state interest" stand-
ard. Accordingly, the Court has applied this test in controversies con-
cerning the right of procreation,78 rights involving criminal procedure, 79
the right to travel,80 and, most important for this article, the right to
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the constitution." Accord, Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
72. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The Court
held: "The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary." Id.
at 78. See also, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Lisco v. Love, 219 F.
Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963); State v. Ducey, 25 Ohio App. 2d 50, 266 N.E.2d 233
(1970).
73. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
74. Id. at 426. The Court also stated: "The standards under which this
proposition is to be evaluated have been set forth many times by this Court.
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The consti-
tutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Id. at 425.
75. Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D.Vt. 1970). See Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
76. Id.
77. McDonald v. Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
78. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
80. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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vote. 81 Any infringement imposed on suffrage rights is therefore sub-
ject to the most careful and meticulous inquiry by the court.
Upon review of the Supreme Court's utilization of the second equal
protection standard for testing the constitutionality of state laws, a trend
has evolved favoring the right to vote over state restraints. State at-
tempts to dilute the votes of certain groups of citizens, have been held
invalid.8 2 Malapportionment of voting districts has been declared un-
constitutional because it denied equal protection of the laws. 83  The
Court invalidated state laws, which excluded non-property owners and
non-property taxpayers from voting in bond issue elections.8 4  Poll tax-
es 8' 5 and literacy tests which give local officials broad discretionary
powers have been struck down under the equal protection clause.86
This trend was broadened to include the right to run for public office.
This occurred when the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state
law requiring that the race of a candidate be designated on voting bal-
lots and nominating petitions. 87
Several of the more recent cases which favor the fundamental right
to vote, are particularly relevant to the issue of the voting residence of
students. In the case of Carrington v. Rash,8 8 the Supreme Court ap-
plied this more exacting standard of equal protection to a provision of
the Texas Constitution. Under that provision no military man who be-
came a Texas resident after entry into the service could acquire a
voting residence in that state so long as he remained in the armed
forces. Thus, the voting ban lasted throughout the individual's mem-
bership in the service. The plaintiff was a serviceman who became a
Texas resident after his entry into the military. He was stationed in
New Mexico but lived across the border in Texas with his family. He
81. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
82. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963).
83. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
84. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra note 50; Cipriano v. Houma, supra note 81;
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra note 81; cf., Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346 (1970).
85. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra note 81; Gray v. Johnson,
234 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
86. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965).
87. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
88. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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intended to make Texas his permanent residence and he even had a
business in Texas. However, he was not permitted to vote in Texas
pursuant to that state's constitutional provision. The Court recognized
that states have the authority to impose reasonable residence restrictions
on the availability of voting ballots and that Texas treated all members
of the military equally. But this was a restraint on the fundamental
right to vote, therefore, the state also had to show a compelling and
legitimate state interest in order to satisfy the equal protection clause.
The following two purposes were asserted by the court:
First, the State says it has a legitimate interest in immunizing its elections from the
concentrated balloting of military personnel, whose collective voice may overwhelm
a small local civilian community. Secondly, the State says it has a valid interest in
protecting the franchise from infiltration by transients, and it can reasonably assume
that those servicemen who fall within the constitutional exclusion will be within the
State for only a short period of time. 89
Rejecting the state's contention that the first purpose (stated above)
was a compelling interest, the court held that residents of a state who
intend to make that place their home indefinitely may not be denied
the right to vote merely because of the way they may vote.90 The
second purpose asserted by the state was also denied because the con-
clusive presumption that servicemen are not Texas residents, could not
be overcome by proof of the most positive character. 91 Since Texas
did not show a "compelling state interest" sufficient to deny the plaintiff
the right to vote, the court held that state's aforementioned constitu-
tional provision invalid under the equal protection clause.
The continuing trend of the Supreme Court to liberally construe the
right to vote was further exemplified in Oregon v. Mitchell.92 In that
case, the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 197093 was chal-
lenged. The act provided for a five year suspension of all literacy
tests,94 uniform rules for absentee voting, the elimination of state resi-
89. Id. at 93.
90. Supra note 88, at 94, where the Court stated: "But if they are in fact
residents, with the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely, they, as all
other qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political repre-
sentation. . . . 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population be-
cause of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible."
91. Supra note 88, at 94.
92. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
93. Act of June 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 also referred to as
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. See generally, Note, Constitutional
Bases For Upholding The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 20 DE PAUL L.
REv. 1002 (1971).
94. Act of June 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 Title II sec. 201.
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dency requirements as a method of disqualifying voters in presidential
and vice-presidential elections,95 and finally an eighteen year old mini-
mum voting age requirement for all federal and state elections. 96 The
court decided that the residency, absentee balloting, and literacy test
provisions were valid but that the eighteen year old minimum voting
age requirement was only valid for national elections (and not state
or local elections).97 Thus the Court not only affirmed its proclivity
towards broadly interpreting suffrage rights, but also approved Con-
gressional intent and authority to extend the right to vote.
In another recent case, the Supreme Court enjoined the Board of
Registry of Montgomery County, Maryland, from removing the names
of residents of the National Institute of Health from the voter rolls of
that county. This institute was a federal enclave located within the
geographical boundaries of Montgomery County, Maryland. In that
case, Evans v. Cornman,98 the board of registry, appellants, relied on
an earlier Maryland Appellate Court decision. The court determined
therein that a resident of a federal reservation was not a resident of
Maryland.99 The Supreme Court applied Carrington v. Rash'00 and
repudiated appellants' contention, stating that "if they are in fact resi-
dents, with the intention of making (the State) their home indefinitely,
they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal oppor-
tunity for political representation.' 0'1 The Court further acknowledged
that the NIH inhabitants were treated as state residents in the census
and in determining congressional apportionment. Being aware that
they were required to establish a compelling state interest, the appel-
lants asserted that their purpose was to insure that only those citizens
who were primarily or substantially interested in, or affected by, elec-
toral decisions have a voice in making them. Moreover the appellants
claimed that NIH residents were substantially less interested in Mary-
land affairs than other citizens of the state because Congress was vested
with "exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever . . .,,102 over fed-
eral enclaves. The Court again did not accept this argument inasmuch
95. Id. sec. 202.
96. Id. sec. 301.
97. Supra note 92.
98. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
99. Royer v. Bd. of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446 (1963).
100. Supra note 88.
101. Evans v. Cornman, supra note 98, at 421; and Carrington v. Rash, supra
note 88, at 94.
102. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
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as the NIH residents were not shown to be sufficiently disinterested in
electoral decisions. On the contrary, NIH residents as well as other
Maryland citizens were equally affected by the state's criminal laws,
spending and taxing decisions, unemployment laws and workmen's com-
pensation laws. The appellees were required to register their automo-
biles in that state and obtain Maryland drivers' permits and license
plates. They were subject to process and jurisdiction of state courts
and could resort to those courts in divorce and child adoption proceed-
ings. Also, persons on NIH grounds sent their children to Maryland
public schools. All these factors led the federal district court to con-
clude that the NIH residents were treated as state residents to such an
extent that it was repugnant to the equal protection clause for the state
to deny them the right to vote. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the
district court's decision, that the appellees were entitled to vote in state
elections by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 3
The Supreme Court's propensity to invalidate state laws that restrict
the right of its residents to vote has permeated the federal district
courts. Several districts have held unconstitutional state voting resi-
dency requirements of six months or more as a prerequisite for exercising
the right to vote. The one year residency requirement for eligibility to
vote in the State of Virginia was held unconstitutional in Bufford v.
Holton.'0 4 Upon finding that Virginia did not satisfy the "compelling
governmental interest test," the district court made the following com-
ment:
On the contrary the difference in treatment of residents, regardless of the State's in-
tendment, is clearly an arbitrary discrimination .... [Tihis call for residence (of one
year) can without more be seen as an obstruction or deterrent to uninhibited inter-
state travel, admittedly a Constitutional prerogative.' 05
In Keppel v. Donovan,156 Minnesota's six month durational residency re-
103. Evans v. Cornman, supra note 98, at 426 where the Court concluded:
"In their day-to-day affairs, residents of the NIH grounds are just as interested in
and connected with electoral decisions as they were prior to 1953 when the area
came under federal jurisdiction and as are their neighbors who live off the enclave.
In nearly every election, federal, state, and local, for offices from the Presi-
dency to the school board, and on the entire variety of other ballot propositions,
appellees have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents. As the District
Court concluded, they are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
that stake by exercising the equal right to vote."
104. 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970). Accord, Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp.
246 (D. Vt. 1970).
105. Id. at 846. Accord, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kohn v.
Davis, supra note 104.
106. 326 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970).
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quirement was held unconstitutional. The court therein recognized that
although this requirement may have been valid at one time, it could
no longer be considered constitutional because the "[n]otions of what
constitutes equal treatment for [the] purpose of the equal protection clause
do change.'107 Furthermore, other district courts have recently held
invalid similar six month voting residency requirements under the equal
protection clause.108
The two note cases, Jolicoeur and Wilkins, are a logical continuance
of the judicial tendency of extending suffrage rights and invalidating
state restraints of such rights under the equal protection clause. It re-
quires no stretch of the imagination to apply to the issue of student
voting residence, the courts' reasoning behind the decisions which found
unconstitutional, six month durational residency requirements. Further-
more, many of the arguments asserted by the states in the Carrington,
Evans, and six month or one year residency requirement cases, which
were denied "compelling state interest" status, were also unsuccessfully
used by the states in the note cases. In both Jolicoeur and Wilkins,10 9
the states attempted to sustain their voting residency restrictions upon
the presumption that students are uninterested, non-permanent residents
of the college community, and that as a voting block they could control
the outcome of an election in a college town. This contention, how-
ever, was not accepted by the Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash, 10
and the respective state supreme courts followed the Carrington ra-
tionale. Moreover, in the Wilkins case, the State of Michigan advanced
as grounds to validate its statute, other state interests which had pre-
viously been found to be constitutionally impermissible. Accordingly,
the Michigan Supreme Court in Wilkins rejected as "compelling state
interests" the preservation of purity of elections by insuring that stu-
dents will not vote twice;"' the prevention of transients from voting;" 2
and the promotion of a concerned and interested electorate. All this
107. Id. at 18.
108. Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Hadnott v. Amos,
320 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
109. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 488 P.2d 1, 4 (1971); Wilkins
v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 691, 189 N.W.2d 423, 432 (1971).
110. Supra note 88.
111. Wilkins v. Bentley, supra note 109, at 685-86, 189 N.W.2d at 430; see also
United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967).
112. Wilkins v. Bentley, supra note 109, at 685-86, 189 N.W.2d at 430; Car-
rington v. Rash, supra note 88.
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was under the presumption that students were unconcerned and unin-
terested non-residents of the district wherein the university was locat-
ed.113
There is an apparent trend by courts to disaffirm state restraints on
the right to vote under the equal protection clause. Thus, courts now
favor upholding suffrage rights of interested bona fide residents. It is
only a simple and logical extension of this trend to apply the rationale
to students residing at college, apart from their parents, and thereby
allow these students to exercise their right to vote at their college home.
Reinforcing this deduction is the inability of the states to show the
"compelling state interest" which is necessary to sustain limitations on
the fundamental right to vote, under the equal protection clause.
Comparison of the fifteenth and twenty-sixth amendments reveals a
striking similarity. The fifteenth amendment provides that:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.1 14 (Emphasis supplied).
As stated at the outset of this article, the twenty-sixth amendment
provides that:
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of age.1 1 5 (Emphasis supplied).
It is apparent that the twenty-sixth amendment is written in the
exact language of the earlier fifteenth amendment. The twenty-sixth
substitutes the word "age" for the words "race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude" as found in the fifteenth. The twenty-sixth also
adds the phrase "who are eighteen years of age or older." The similar
wording found in the twenty-sixth and the fifteenth amendments leads
to the presumption that Congress wished the twenty-sixth amendment
to have the same liberal interpretation now given to the fifteenth, and
thus avoid a similar volume of litigation that arose from the enactment
of the fifteenth amendment. 116 Congress became aware of these prob-
113. Evans v. Comman, supra note 98. The circumstances and reasoning the
Supreme Court used to determine that NIH residents were entitled to vote in
Maryland are strikingly similar to circumstances and reasoning in Wilkins. Ac-
cord, Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra note 50; Cipriano v. Houma, supra note 81.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
115. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1.
116. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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lems confronting Negro voters and passed the Voting Rights Act of
1965,117 which the Supreme Court upheld in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach.118
Since the fifteenth amendment resulted in almost continuous litigation
throughout which the Supreme Court showed a definite propensity to
invalidate state restraints on the rights of blacks to vote, the Congres-
sional purpose, in using similar language in the twenty-sixth amendment,
may have been to deter similar state restrictions on the right of en-
franchised minors which encompasses student voters residing on college
campuses, apart from their parents. If, however, this was not the Con-
gressional intent in the enactment of the twenty-sixth amendment, then
the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation and extension of the fifteenth
amendment is indicative of why student residency requirements should
be invalidated.
The statement of the Court in Jolicoeur v. Mihaly" dictates that
students' attendance on the college campus is sufficient to establish the
residency requirement pursuant to the twenty-sixth amendment. In that
case, the Court stated:
Obviously, in giving the minor the right to vote, it was never contemplated that the
parent or guardian should be able to control whether or not the minor should be pre-
mitted to vote or how he should exercise the franchise. It was necessarily the inten-
tion to accept him as a responsible member of the community, capable of participat-
ing in its political affairs, directing its policies, and choosing its leaders. For these
purposes, he must be free entirely of parental control, and unless he is, the right to
vote granted to him would be meaningless.12 0
This statement as well as the foregoing arguments is what the United
States Supreme Court should consider in making a determination con-
ceming the validity of state laws restricting the franchise right of stu-
dent voters.
Jerold Siegan
Accord, Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); Schnell v. Davis,
336 U.S. 933 (1949).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
118. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
119. Supra note 47.
120. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, supra note 47, at 707, 488 P.2d at 11.
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